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Sinaida Michalskaja’s philosophical Windows
Sandra Plummer, UCL Slade School of Fine Art
‘[A] picture of the inside of a window is an exemplary photograph—the first 
photograph one should attempt, the origin point of one’s photography, the origin of all 
photography. Where Niépce and Daguerre both take pictures from their windows, Talbot 
makes an image of his window. He tells us that photography is about framing, and then shows
us nothing but that frame; he suggests that photography offers a window onto the world, but 
then shows nothing but that window... This, then, is no ordinary picture. It is rather what 
Talbot elsewhere called a “Philosophical Window” (Batchen 2000: 9-10). 
In his reflections on Talbot’s series of pictures of his oriel window (1835-1839), Geoffrey 
Batchen appraises both the literal and metaphorical qualities of these early photographs.1 
Batchen suggests that Talbot is presenting us with a picture that transcends the descriptive 
capacity of the pencil of nature. For Batchen, these are pictures that reflect on their method of
picturing. Sinaida Michalskaja’s photographs operate in a similar manner – as photographs 
that reflect on photography. Windows are metaphorical evocations of photography as a 
‘window on the world’; they are meta-photographs. Michalskaja’s windows are not just literal
windows, they are philosophical windows.
A photograph of a window is a reflection on the act of viewing. Windows are reflexive 
explorations of photography as a transparent means of picturing. The notion of self-
referential photography suggests formalist -and specifically Greenbergian- associations. 
Greenberg however did not credit photography with self-referentiality: under his constraints 
photography was not an autonomous art medium able to reflect on, and point to its form.2      
Conversely, Michalskaja’s Windows reflexively evoke and reject the notion of photography as
a transparent medium. This occurs at a literal and metaphorical level. While some present 
interior views visible through the perfectly clear glass, in others this transparency is disrupted
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by reflections or smears on the window. In Nigel, white drips of almost translucent opacity 
trickle down panes of glass merging with the painterly reflections of trees. This veils and 
obscures the view of the interior image, and has the effect of rendering the otherwise 
transparent window/screen opaque. The impressionistic panels in the upper half of the 
window operate as pictures within pictures: frames within frames, mise en abyme. There is an
enframing; a revealing that is a concealing, a presencing of the window that is also a 
hiddenness. The Heideggerian concept of enframing has a central role in his text ‘The 
Question Concerning Technology’ – an essay that has been adapted by the artist into ‘The 
Question Concerning the Window’ and serves as a philosophical extension of the work.3 
What does it mean to photo-graph the photograph, to frame the frame, to see seeing? These 
windows are literally and metaphorically transparent and opaque. 
Michalskaja’s Windows are reflective of photography in general, but individual windows are 
also literally reflective. They depict windows that act as mirrors: reflecting the landscape or 
architecture opposite them. When the window acts as a mirror the external landscape is 
superimposed onto the glass threshold. Some examples combine transparency and reflectivity
simultaneously - dappled leaves merge with an interior scene to form a montage of inside and
outside. Other pictures depict only the external reflection, as if to refuse the intrusive gaze. 
Reflected buildings are often distorted (an effect exacerbated by the minor misalignments of 
the panes of glass), occasionally these distortions become kaleidoscopic; the picture breaks 
down, there is a fragmentation and disintegration of the pictorial. Metaphorically, 
Michalskaja’s Windows recall Oliver Wendell Holmes’ description of photography as a 
‘mirror with a memory’.4 Photography’s pre-history is also permeated with fictional 
imaginings of the power to fix what is reflected in the mirror. Tiphaigne de la Roche’s novel 
Giphantie (1760) recounts a method of producing stable pictures (through the application of a
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viscous matter to a prepared canvas) that are similar to the image reflected in a mirror.5 
Conceived in this manner, photography is the fulfilment of a desire to possess a persistent and
lasting mirror-image.6 Daguerreotypes perhaps come closest to fulfilling this desire in the 
sense that they are also reflective pictures, preserving on a mirrored-surface the subject, or 
event, as it appeared or occurred before the lens. The polished surface enables a temporal and
figural doubling - the first event is preserved as a fixed image yet the daguerreotype also 
reflects what occurs fleetingly in the present. Similarly, in Windows the glossiness of the 
photographic surface reflects the viewer. The addition of a translucent foil -which acts as a 
type of glaze over the photograph- appears to compound this effect. Installation images reveal
distinct reflections on top of the same photograph. In Manu (Mommsenstraße)7 the reflections
almost read as a projection onto the surface of the image – suggesting a durational moving 
image on top of the still photograph.  
 
Michalskaja’s Windows depict what is beyond the window - not only the interior spaces, but 
also the reflected external landscape. Photographic seeing is fundamental to the creation and 
reception of these images. Talbot’s photographs of his interior oriel window do not depict the 
landscape beyond it, vision is almost entirely curtailed by the window itself. Reflecting on 
their process, Batchen has proposed that Talbot’s photographs look out from within the 
camera obscura to an interior window which serves as ‘the metaphorical lens of the camera of
his own house’ (2000: 9). Michalskaja’s Windows in contrast are photographs of the other 
side of the window pane. The photographer is on the opposite side of the glass, perhaps 
unable to enter the interior space. This looking then entails a voyeuristic gaze that is extended
to the viewer of the photograph (who becomes complicit in this voyeurism). Sometimes the 
interior view is obscured by a drawn curtain, by reflective or opaque textured glass or even 
by bars on the window. What is perhaps more significant however is the way in which these 
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photographs reflect metaphorically on seeing. While Talbot’s windows produce a picturing of
their own apparatus -the camera obscura- at work, Michalskaja’s Windows recall earlier 
drawing aids (that incorporated reflection) such as the Claude glass or the camera lucida. The 
Claude glass was a handheld dark convex mirror that produced a reflection (from behind the 
artist) that was particularly suitable as an aid in the composition of landscapes.8 Reflective 
windows create a similar reverse view to that of the (late eighteenth century) Claude glass. 
The (early nineteenth century) camera lucida was the device that lay at the origin of Talbot’s 
desire for photography. As Talbot notes in his The Pencil of Nature, this desire was later 
realised through the apparatus of the camera obscura.9 While Talbot’s windows are captured 
in the dark interior room of his home, Michalskaja’s are generated outdoors in natural 
sunlight. Michalskaja’s Windows are created in an illuminated space rather than a dark 
chamber; they correspond in this sense to a camera-lucida rather than a camera obscura. 
Windows reflect on the nature of photography as a medium that produces what is seen by the 
photographer. Yet Michalskaja’s Windows also exceed the conventional construction of 
photographic vision. Windows depict the interiors of domestic and other spaces that 
Michalskaja has positioned her camera to look into, but we also see what the photographer 
has turned her back on. The reflection in the window of the sky or architecture opposite 
reveals what would normally be beyond photographic seeing. This is a kind of reversal of 
photography and a return to pre-photographic seeing enabled by devices such as the Claude 
glass (which also produced a reflection of what was behind the artist). The superimposed 
reflection belongs to the exterior of the glass threshold: it obscures the voyeuristic seeing of 
the interior space and flattens the spatial depth of the representation. However, this reflection 
also produces an extension of the photographer’s gaze and of the photographic field of vision.
The window depicts a surplus vision (that belongs to a reverse view); it screens what should 
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be the photographer’s blind spot. In this sense Windows demonstrate an expansion of 
photographic seeing.
Michalskaja creates a convergence between the transparency of the window and the 
transparent photographic medium. In Andy the window operates as a screen that transparently
reveals the still-life of flowers in the interior (a picture within the picture) but also 
simultaneously depicts the reflections of external tree branches. The disruption of the literal 
transparency of the photograph is most pronounced when the window/screen is cracked. 
Michel combines the texture of the interior curtain behind the window with the shadowy 
-exterior- reflection of the houses opposite. However, the cracked panes disrupt the viewing 
of the picture within the frame, forcing us to see the screen itself. What occurs here resonates 
with Yve Lomax’s account of ‘the fracture’ within the ‘seemingly smooth and transparent 
surface of the photographic image’. This fissure in the image draws the viewer’s ‘attention to 
the photographic surface’ so they can no longer look through ‘the photograph as if it were a 
window, a pane of glass’ (Lomax 16).
Martin is a photograph of a broad expanse of blue sky perfectly reflected in a quartered 
square window; the sky fills the entire window frame within the picture. The documentation 
of this photograph creates spatial ambiguity that is compounded by the means of display. The 
original (mounted) photograph is placed on top of a wooden stand on the ground of the 
Lethaby Gallery. The photograph appears to acquire actual depth (becoming object-like) and 
interacts with the adjacent window in which it is reflected. The shadow cast by light through 
this adjacent window interrupts the image in the original photograph. This secondary shadow 
obscures part of the photograph from view. It also adds spatial and temporal ‘depth’ to the 
image creating further uncertainty with regard to what we are seeing. The dark recess of the 
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original -representational- window merge with the newly cast shadow that proceeds from it. 
In the documentation of Leonn and Johannes a glaze of translucent film partly covers the 
front of the photograph adding a literal layer of depth. Other works have been positioned so 
that they merge with real objects. In both Jungle and Lilly and Two Money Trees, inkjet prints
have been placed behind windows (Ekistics and Ikebana Observatory Vol 1, Oxford House, 
2014). In these additions to actual windows, the shallow space of a (real) interior -as depicted
in the photograph- is replaced with a virtual representational interior of a window. What is 
depicted is a photograph of a photograph, yet it acquires objecthood in its convergence with 
an actual window. The photograph is actualised in this convergence.
Sinaida Michalskaja’s Windows are philosophical reflections on the nature of photography. 
The reflexive aspect of Windows is immediately apparent. They may include literal aspects of
a reflected landscape or reveal glimpses of a domestic interior, but they are essentially 
meditations on looking. They also produce a presencing of their subject matter – literally and 
metaphorically. Windows are philosophical in their self-referential exploration of the 
convergent transparency of photography and windows (subverting our tendency to look 
through without seeing the metaphorical window). These works become -in Talbot’s words- 
‘philosophical windows’ that expand the conception of photographic seeing. The 
philosophical aspect is also foregrounded in their accompanying text ‘The Question 
Concerning the Window’ (the artist’s adaptation of Heidegger’s ‘The Question Concerning 
Technology’) in which Heidegger’s text has been transformed into a treatise on windows. But
this adaptation could perhaps also be extended to photography. This work is not simply a 
question concerning a window, but a question concerning photographs.
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How does Heidegger conceive of photography? The question concerning photography is 
addressed in Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (where it is discussed in a 
section titled ‘Image and Schema’). Heidegger initially discusses the photograph as an 
example of the secondary type of image – as reproduction or ‘likeness’ in contrast to the first 
type of image (the ‘this here’):
‘That which shows itself here always has the character of the immediately seen 
particular (“this-here”)’…Thus the image is always an intuitable this-here, and for this
reason every likeness – for example, a photograph – remains only a transcription of 
what shows itself immediately as “image”’ (1990: 65-66). 
The photograph is proposed then as an example of a secondary type of image -a mere 
likeness or copy of what is at hand. Heidegger subsequently asserts that the photograph is an 
‘image in the first and broad sense’ of the term where it corresponds to the look of 
‘something at hand’ (65-66). It shows itself and that what it copies as likeness. Jean-Luc 
Nancy highlights that this type of image also shows the showing itself of the original thing; 
this is an inversion of ‘mimetic values’ - ‘every copy copies the thing and the thing’s 
showing-itself’.10 The photograph however can also show itself according to Heidegger – ‘the
photograph shows not only how what is photographed, but also how a photograph in general, 
appears’ (1990: 66). Nancy proposes that the photograph ‘shows itself as a photograph, and it
shows the showing-itself of the photographed thing’ (86). The photograph then appears to be 
intuited both as a likeness of the image and as an ‘image’ (in the first sense). The photograph 
(as a reproduction) shows not only the image it depicts but also its own fact of being a 
photograph – it shows not only its picture (in its function as photograph), but also how a 
photograph appears. The ‘look’ of the photograph is both that of what it represents (the ‘this 
here’) and of the photograph in general. Sinaida Michalskaja’s Windows initially appear to 
show only the window, and the showing itself of the window as a thing. Yet they also show 
7
‘how a photograph in general, appears’ (Heidegger 1990: 66). Windows reveal the general 
look of the photograph but also the looking entailed within photography, an appearing and a 
presencing of photography that echoes Heidegger’s reflections on the medium.
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